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Abstract
This paper analyses a model of vertical product differentiation with one incumbent
and one entrant firm. It is shown that if firms can produce only one quality level
welfare in this entry game can be lower than in monopoly. This is the case if qualities
are strategic complements because the incumbent may distort its quality downwards.
If firms can produce a quality range and practice non-linear pricing welfare in case
of entry deterrence is higher than in monopoly because the incumbent enlarges its
product line. If entry is accommodated consumer rent increases but the consequences
on welfare are ambiguous.
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1 Introduction
There are a lot of different ways how an incumbent firm reacts when facing the
threat of entry. For example, in the pharmaceutical market after patent expiration
some formerly protected monopolists introduced their own generics to keep com-
petitors out of themarket1 while others abstained from such practice and increased
its price after entry generic competitors.2
Another example is the airline industry. In Canada in fall 2000 the low cost carrier
CanJet Airlines entered the Toronto-Halifax market. The reaction of Air Canada,
the incumbent, was not to increase its price like in the pharmaceutical industry
but to lower its fares.3 A quite different strategy was pursued by British Airways.
Its reaction on the entry of low cost carriers on long haul routes was to reduce
economy class capacity and enlarge premium class capacity thereby increasing
its average prices.4 Many flag carriers instead tried to deter entry of low cost air-
lines by establishing their own ’no-frills’-airline. This was done by British Airways
on short-haul routes with the subsidiary GO. In 2000 the Dutch carrier KLM fol-
lowed and established Basiq Air and in 2002 the low cost carrier Germanwings
was founded.5 Germanwings is an affiliate company of Eurowings. In turn, Eu-
rowings is controlled by the German flag carrier Lufthansa.
So a couple of questions arise. Why do incumbents pursue so many different
strategies to seemingly the same problem, namely threat of entry? Does an in-
cumbent’s strategy differ if it can produce only one quality level or a whole qual-
ity range? What are the welfare consequences of this potential competition, i.e.
does welfare always increase in such a scenario or is it possible that a protected
monopoly is better?
This paper tries to answer these questions in a vertical product differentiation
framework. We compare a model where each firm can produce a single quality
with one where price discrimination over a quality range is possible. We show
1See Hollis (2003).
2See Grabowski & Vernon (1992) or Frank & Salkever (1997).
3See Gillen (2002).
4See Johnson & Myatt (2003).
5See Gilroy, Lukas, & Volpert (2003).
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that in the single quality case welfare with potential competition can be lower
than in monopoly. The intuition is that if qualities are strategic complements the
incumbent lowers its quality in comparison to monopoly and produces some mid-
dle range quality to deter entry because it is impossible then for an entrant to find
a profitable entry segment. Even in case of entry such a quality reduction might be
profitable, causing the entrant to produce a low quality and reducing price compe-
tition. If qualities are strategic substitutes the incumbent produces higher quality
and welfare increases.
If firms can produce a quality range we find that consumer rent with potential
competition is higher than under monopoly. The intuition is that in order to deter
entry the incumbent enlarges its product line to occupy the lower segment as well.
In this case welfare increases as well. If entry cannot be deterred there is a gap
between the two firms’s quality ranges which reduces competition. In this case
consumer rent always increases because of lower prices while the consequences
on welfare are unclear. The reason is that some consumers buy a higher quality
but others buy a lower one.
Specifically, we analyse a model of vertical product differentiation with entry. In
the first stage the incumbent produces a quality which cannot be changed in the
sequel. After observing this quality level the entrant decides if it wants to enter
and if so which quality level it wants to produce. In the third stage firms compete
in prices dependent on the produced quality levels.6
We compare this situation of potential competition with a situation of monopoly.
In monopoly the firm produces too low a level of quality. The reason is that the
monopolist can only charge one price which is the valuation of the marginal con-
sumer. The valuation of the inframarginal consumer is higher but cannot be repre-
sented in the price. In the scenario of potential entry the incumbent can deter entry
by varying its quality level. If qualities are strategic complements in the sense of
Bulow, Geanakoplos, & Klemperer (1985) a reduction of the incumbent’s quality
leads to a reduction of the entrant’s quality which lowers the entrant’s profit.7 If
6Throughout the paper we assume that it is more profitable for the incumbent to be the high
quality firm than the low quality firm.
7In a different terminology which is used by Fudenberg & Tirole (1984) the strategy where the
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fixed costs of entry are high enough entry is deterred by a quality reduction and
welfare is lower than under monopoly. Even in the case where entry is accommo-
dated it might be profitable for the incumbent to reduce its quality. The entrant
lowers its quality as well which results in lessened price competition. So even in
case of competition it is possible that welfare is lower than under monopoly. If
products are strategic substitutes welfare rises in both cases (entry deterrence and
accommodation) because the incumbent increases its quality.8 We also show that
if marginal costs of production are low quality of the incumbent in case of entry is
higher than in monopoly. The intuition is that the incumbent wishes to differenti-
ate itself from its competitor by producing a higher quality. If marginal costs are
low it is not very costly to do so and quality in case of entry is higher.
We also analyse a model where each firm can produce a whole range of different
qualities and engage in second-degree price discrimination. This model is com-
pared with the single quality case and we find that the results differ in some re-
spects. In the model with price discrimination the lowest quality of the incum-
bent and the highest quality of the entrant are strategic complements. So if the
incumbent enlarges its quality range the profit of the entrant decreases. Thus the
incumbent’s entry deterrence strategy is to expand its product line which results
in a welfare increase because more consumers are served. This is different from the
single quality case where welfare in case of entry deterrence can be lower if qual-
ities are strategic complements. If fixed costs of entry are low and the incumbent
accommodates entry then we always get a gap between the two product lines of
incumbent and entrant in order to reduce price competition. Thus some qualities
in the middle range which are produced in monopoly are no longer produced in
duopoly. But more qualities in the lower segment are produced in duopoly. The re-
sult is that some consumers buy higher quality in duopoly while others buy lower
quality. Therefore the consequence on welfare is not clear. By contrast, it can be
shown that consumer rent always increases in case of entry due to increased price
competition.
incumbent reduces quality to deter entry is called the ’lean and hungry look’.
8In the terminology of Fudenberg & Tirole (1984) this strategy is called ’Top Dog’.
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For both models, single quality case and price discrimination, we provide two
empirical examples from different industries where firms’ behaviour is similar to
that predicted by our model.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section ourmodel is
related to the existing literature. Section 3 presents the model and the equilibrium
without price discrimination. Some anecdotal evidence that supports the results is
given in Section 4. Section 5 presents the model, the equilibrium, and the welfare
consequences if price discrimination is possible. In Section 6 two practical exam-
ples for such firm behaviour are given. Section 7 gives a short conclusion and some
policy implications. Most proofs of the results are presented in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
Our model relates to the literatures on vertical product differentiation, second-
degree price discrimination, and market entry. We will give the relation to each of
the three branches and how our model differs from these literatures in turn.
The literature on quality competition started with the pioneering work of Gab-
szewicz & Thisse (1979) and Shaked & Sutton (1982). In their models firms are
restricted to produce one quality level and compete in prices. In Gabszewicz &
Thisse (1979) firms’ qualities are exogenously given while in Shaked & Sutton
(1982) firms decide simultaneously about their quality levels in the stage before
price competition. Shaked & Sutton (1982) show that firms will produce differ-
ent quality levels to avoid fierce competition in the last stage of the game. Under
some parameter constellations only two firms are active in the market if there exist
costs of entry. Shaked & Sutton (1982) were the first to analyse the now common
game structure where firms are committed to their quality levels when competing
in prices because prices can be changed at will while a quality change involves
modifications of the production facilities.
Ronnen (1991) analyses a model with a similar framework as Shaked & Sutton
(1982) but where a regulation authority can set a minimum quality standard be-
fore firms compete in qualities. In his model qualities are strategic complements.
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Thus if the minimum quality standard is set (slightly) above the quality which is
produced by the low quality firm in a game without restriction, both qualities will
rise in equilibrium. Price competition is intensified and all consumers are better off
while the high quality firm loses. Ronnen (1991) shows that with an appropriately
chosen standard social welfare improves.
Cabrales (2003) looks at the consequence of a price ceiling. He shows that with
a lower price ceiling the market share of the high quality variant increases. The
reason is that market share depends on the ratio of price to quality. But the quality
responds less than proportionally to the price ceiling if the cost function is convex.
He applies his model to regulation issues in the pharmaceutical market.
In contrast to these models my paper analyses a sequential move game in the qual-
ity decision. It might therefore be possible for the first mover to deter entry by an
appropriate quality choice. Also welfare in this sequential structure is compared
with a pure monopoly situation.
There are several papers which analyse competition between multiproduct firms.9
The closest to themodel considered here are Champsaur &Rochet (1989) and John-
son & Myatt (2003). Champsaur & Rochet (1989) analyse a duopoly where firms
commit in the first stage to a quality range and in the second stage compete in
prices for each produced quality. They show that firms produce non overlapping
quality ranges (there is always a gap between the two product lines) to reduce
price competition. This result appears in my paper as well. The difference is that
in my paper quality decisions are taken sequentially and one firm has a first mover
advantage. This influences prices and quality ranges and may results in entry de-
terrence. I also provide a welfare analysis.
Johnson &Myatt (2003) analyse an asymmetric duopoly. One firm (which is called
’incumbent’ by Johnson & Myatt (2003)) can produce the entire range of qualities
while the other (the ’entrant’) is limited to some range with an upper quality level.
So the incumbent can produce upgrade versions. Firms compete simultaneously
9Spulber (1989) analyses a model where firms are horizontally differentiated on a Hotelling line.
He shows that each firm produces the first best quality for the consumer who is located exactly at
the firm’s position while qualities for all other consumers are distorted downwards. Stole (1995) in
addition to Spulber (1989) considers the case where firms are uncertain about vertical preferences.
He finds that a similar result holds in this case.
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in quantities for each quality level. As is shown by Johnson & Myatt (2003) the
incumbent may produce fewer qualities (’product line pruning’) or more qualities
(’fighting brands’) in duopoly than in monopoly dependent on the cost function.
If marginal revenue is decreasing the quality range is reduced while the quality
range might be broader if marginal revenue is increasing in some regions.
A model of market entry in a vertical product differentiation framework is anal-
ysed by Donnenfeld & Weber (1995).10 In their model there are two incumbents
who face the entry threat of a third firm. They show that the equilibrium depends
on the level of the fixed costs of entry. If these fixed costs are low entry is accom-
modated and the incumbents select extreme qualities to reduce price competition.
The entrant chooses a quality in the middle.11 If fixed costs are in some middle
range incumbents deter entry. They do this by producing similar qualities which
leads to harsh competition and low profits. If fixed costs are so high that entry is
blockaded incumbents choose sharply differentiated products to reduce competi-
tion. In contrast to Donnenfeld & Weber (1995), my model analyses the behaviour
of only one incumbent but firms can produce quality ranges and engage in second
degree price discrimination.
In short, models of vertical product differentiation usually do not consider the
possibility of price discrimination if entry is possible. So this paper makes a first
attempt to analyse the equilibrium and the welfare consequences of such a strat-
egy.
3 The Model without Price Discrimination
This section presents the model where each firm can produce only one quality
level.
10For a model of entry deterrence and horizontal preferences see Bonanno (1987).
11A similar result is obtained in Donnenfeld &Weber (1992) in the case without fixed costs. They
show that in this case the entrant’s profit is higher than the profit of the incumbent which produces
the lower quality.
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3.1 Description of the Model
There is a continuum of consumers of mass 1. Each consumer purchases a single
unit of a good. If a consumer decides to purchase from firm i she gets a good of
quality qi at price pi. Consumers’ tastes are described by the parameter θ which is
distributed between 0 and 1 with distribution function F (θ) and density function
f(θ). The utility from purchasing from firm i can therefore be denoted as
U(qi, θ, pi) = u(qi, θ)− pi,
where u is assumed to be strictly concave in q and in θ and thrice continuously
differentiable. Consumers’ reservation value from not buying is normalised to
zero.
We proceed by making a few assumptions on the utility and the distribution func-
tion.
A1 : Single Crossing Property : uqθ(q, θ) > 0
A2 : uqθθ(q, θ) ≤ 0, uqqθ(q, θ) ≥ 0
A3 : Monotone Hazard Rate Condition : ∂
∂θ
(
1−F (θ)
f(θ)
)
≤ 0.
A1 is the single crossing property. It states that utility and marginal utility go in
the same direction if θ increases. It implies that indifference curves cross only once.
This assumption is standard in the literature. A2 imposes two technical assump-
tions that guarantee that the second order conditions are satisfied. A3 is a standard
assumption in the adverse selection literature and is called monotone hazard rate
condition. It is satisfied by many distribution functions like the uniform distribu-
tion, the normal distribution etc.
There are two firms i = 1, 2. Firm 1 is the incumbent and firm 2 the potential
entrant. If a firm decides to produce quality q it has to incur development costs
c(q) with c′(q) > 0 and c′′(q) > 0.12 c(q) is the same for both firms. Marginal costs
are denoted v and are the same for both firms as well.
The game structure is as follows. The game has three stages. In stage 1 firm 1
chooses q1. Firm 2 decides about market entry in stage 2 after observing the choice
12c(q) satisfies the standard Inada-conditions limq→0 c′(q) = 0 and limq→∞ c′(q) =∞.
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of firm 1. If firm 2 decides not to enter firm 1 is a monopolist in stage three and
decides about p1. If firm 2 enters it has to incur fixed costs of market entry of F 13
and chooses q2 in stage 2. Firm 1 observes q2 and in stage 3 both firms set their
prices p1 and p2 conditional on q1 and q2.
The important feature of the model is that both firms are committed to the quality
they produce. In particular it is not possible for firm 1 to make a later change in
the quality to which it has committed in stage 1.14 This time structure represents
the idea that it is easy and almost costless possible to change prices but it takes a
considerable amount of time and costs to change the quality of a good.15
3.2 Monopoly Situation
First let us look at the monopoly case as a benchmark which is later compared
with the results of the entry game. So suppose firm 1 is a monopolist and there
is no potential entrant. In other words stage 2 of the game does not exist and
firm 1 chooses first q1 and then p1. Let the marginal consumer who is served by
the monopolist be called θmonm . If quality is q1 this marginal consumer is given by
u(q1, θ
mon
m ) − p1 = 0. So all types θmonm ≤ θ ≤ 1 are buying from the monopolist
while all types θ < θmonm are not buying. In the last stage the monopolist chooses
its price given quality q1. The maximisation problem is thus
max
p1
Π1 =
∫ 1
θmonm
[p1 − vq1]f(θ)dθ − c(q1).
Since θmonm is determined by p1 it is convenient to make a change in the decision
variables and let θmonm be the decision variable. Thus we have
max
θmonm
Π1 =
∫ 1
θmonm
[u(q1, θ
mon
m )− vq1]f(θ)dθ − c(q1).
13These entry costs might contain advertising expenditures to inform consumers about the en-
trant’s product, investment in transportation channels and so on.
14For a model where such commitment is only partially possible see Henkel (2003).
15This line of reasoning is followed in most models of vertical product differentiation, see for
example Shaked & Sutton (1982) or Ronnen (1991).
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This results in a first order condition of
∂Π1
∂θmonm
= −f(θmonm )[u(q1, θmonm )− vq1] + (1− F (θmonm ))uθ(q1, θmonm ) = 0. (1)
Because of Assumption A3 the second order condition is globally satisfied.
The first order condition as usual states that the marginal gain from serving an
additional consumer type (first term) is equal to the loss on all other consumers
because of the price reduction (second term).
Turning to the first stage where the firm decides about quality q1 we get a first
order condition of16
∂Π1
∂q1
= (1− F (θmonm ))[uq1(q1, θmonm )− v]− c′(q1) = 0. (2)
The second order condition is globally satisfied because of uq1q1(q1, θmonm ) < 0 and
c′′(q1) > 0. Thus we get that θmon∗m is given by (1), pmon∗ = u(qmon∗1 , θmon∗m ) and qmon∗1
is given by (2).
A comparison of the monopolistic outcome with the welfare maximising outcome
yields
Proposition 1
Compared with the welfare-maximizing θWFm and qWF a monopolist
serves too few consumers, θmon∗m > θWFm , and provides too low a quality
qWF > qmon∗1 .
Proof
See the Appendix.
The result that too few consumers are served by a monopolist is standard. The
intuition for the quality distortion is that the monopolist can charge only one price
namely pmon∗1 = u(qmon∗1 , θmon∗m ) for its produced quality. So by increasing quality it
can only increase its price by the amount that the utility of the marginal consumer
16Because of the Envelope Theorem terms with ∂Π1∂θmonm
∂θmonm
∂q1
= 0 and can therefore be ignored in
the first order condition.
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rises. But the utility of all types θ > θmon∗m rises more from a quality increase than
the utility of the marginal consumer because of the single crossing property. Thus
from a welfare point of view quality in monopoly is too low. Since the monopolist
also serves too few consumers the downward distortion of quality is intensified.
3.3 Potential Competition
Now let us turn to the three stage game in which firm 2 can enter the market in
stage 2. In the following let us define q2(q1) as the best answer of firm 2 if it enters
in response to firm 1 producing q1. Before starting with the analysis we need two
additional assumptions:
A4 : Π2(q
mon∗
1 , q2(q
mon∗
1 )) > 0
A5 : Π1(q
H
1 , q2(q
H
1 )) > Π1(q
L
1 , q2(q
L
1 ))
whenever qH1 > q2(qH1 ) and qL1 < q2(qL1 ).
The first assumption states that the profit of firm 2 is positive if firm 1 produces
its optimal monopoly quality. The assumption is made to avoid the uninteresting
case that it is an equilibrium if firm 1 produces its monopoly quality and firm 2
stays out of the market. In the terminology of Bain (1956) this would mean that
entry is blockaded. Assumption A5 states that firm 1’s profit is higher if it is the
high quality firm, i.e. produces such a quality in stage 1 that the optimal response
of firm 2 is to produce a lower quality in stage 2.
As usual the game is solved by backwards induction.
In the third stage there are two possibilities. Either firm 2 has entered in stage 2 and
there is competition or firm 2 stayed out of the market and firm 1 is a monopolist.
If firm 1 is a monopolist the marginal consumer is determined in the same way
as in the last subsection and θmonm is given by (1) given the quality q1 firm 1 has
produced in stage 1 (which is different from qmon∗1 because of Assumption A4.)
If firm 2 has entered the market in stage 2 firms compete for consumers in stage
3. Because of Assumption A5 firm 1 will always produce a quality q1 such that
it is optimal for firm 2 to produce q2 < q1. It is therefore apparent that firm 1
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will serve higher consumer types. The marginal consumer θduom1 who is indifferent
between buying from firm 1 and buying from firm 2 is given by u(q1, θduom1 ) − p1 =
u(q2, θ
duo
m1 ) − p2 or p1 = p2 + u(q1, θduom1 ) − u(q2, θduom1 ). Thus firm 1’s profit function is
given by
Π1 =
∫ 1
θduom1
[p2 + u(q1, θ
duo
m1 )− u(q2, θduom1 )− vq1]f(θ)dθ − c(q1).
Maximising this with respect to θduom1 yields
∂Π1
∂θduom1
= −f(θduom1 )[p2 + u(q1, θduom1 )− u(q2, θduom1 )− vq1]+
(1− F (θduom1 ))(uθ(q1, θduom1 )− uθ(q2, θduom1 )) = 0.
(3)
The second order condition is globally satisfied because of Assumptions A2 and
A3.
Concerning firm 2 the marginal consumer θduom2 who is indifferent between buying
at firm 2 and buying nothing is given by u(q2, θduom2 ) − p2 = 0 or p2 = u(q2, θduom2 ).
Thus the profit function of firm 2 is
Π2 =
∫ θduom2
θduom1
[u(q2, θ
duo
m2 )− vq2]f(θ)dθ − c(q2)− F.
The first order condition is
∂Π2
∂θduom2
= −f(θduom2 )[u(q2, θduom2 )− vq2] + (1− F (θduom2 ))uθ(q2, θduom2 ) = 0. (4)
Again because of Assumption A3 the second order condition is satisfied.
In equilibrium marginal consumers θ∗m1 and θ∗m2 are given by (3) and (4) and equi-
libriumprices are given by p∗1 = u(q2, θ∗m2)+u(q1, θ∗m1)−u(q2, θ∗m1) and p∗2 = u(q2, θ∗m2).17
Now let us look at stage 2 and suppose for the moment that firm 2 has entered. In
this case firm 2 maximises its profit with respect to q2 which yields
∂Π2
∂q2
= (F (θ∗m1)− F (θ∗m2))(uq(q2, θ∗m2)− v) + [u(q2, θ∗m2)− vq2]f(θ)
∂θ∗m1
∂q2
− c′(q2) = 0.
(5)
17Variables marked with a star indicate equilibrium values of the game after firm 2 has entered.
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The second order condition is satisfied because of uqq(q, θ) < 0 and c′′(q) > 0. q∗2 is
given by (5) and since θ∗m1 is dependent on q1, q∗2 is dependent on q1 as well.
Firm 2 only enters if
∫ θ∗m2
θ∗m1
[u(q∗2, θ
∗
m2)− vq∗2]f(θ)dθ − c(q∗2) > F.
Firm 1 in stage 1 does now take into account that q∗2 depends on q1. Its first order
condition if firm 2 enters is given by
∂Π1
∂q1
= (1− F (θ∗m1))(uq1(q1, θ∗m1)− v
−[uq2(q∗2, θ∗m1)− uq2(q∗2, θ∗m2)− uθ(q∗2, θ∗m2)]∂θ
∗
m2
∂q∗2
∂q∗2
∂q1
)− c′(q1) = 0.
(6)
But if F is high enough then firm 1 also has the possibility to choose q1 in such a
way that firm 2 does not enter. Let us denote the quality that deters entry of firm 2
by qED1 . It is given by
∫ θ∗m2
θ∗m1
[u(q∗2(q
ED
1 ), θ
∗
m2)− vq∗2(qED1 )]f(θ)dθ − c(q∗2(qED1 )) = F.
If firm 1 produces this qED1 it is a monopolist in stage 3 and earns profits of
ΠED1 =
∫ 1
θ∗m(qED1 )
[u(qED1 , θ
∗
m(q
ED
1 ))− vqED1 ]f(θ)dθ − c(qED1 ).
Thus firm 1 engages in entry deterrence if and only if
ΠED1 =
∫ 1
θ∗m(qED1 )
[u(qED1 , θ
∗
m(q
ED
1 ))− vqED1 ]f(θ)dθ − c(qED1 ) >∫ 1
θ∗m1
[u(q∗2, θ
∗
m2) + u(q
∗
1, θ
∗
m1)− u(q∗2, θ∗m1)− vq∗1]f(θ)dθ − c(q∗1) = Πduo1 .
We are now in a position to state the equilibrium of the game:
• If ΠED1 > Πduo1 then firm 1 chooses qED1 , firm 2 does not enter in stage 2 and
p∗1 = u(q
ED
1 , θ
∗
m)where θ∗m is given by (1) with q1 = qED1 .
• If ΠED1 ≤ Πduo1 then q∗1 is given by (6), firm 2 enters in stage 2 and q∗2 is given
by (5). θ∗m1 and θ∗m2 are given by (3) and (4) and p∗1 = u(q∗2, θ∗m2) + u(q∗1, θ∗m1)−
u(q∗2, θ
∗
m1) and p∗2 = u(q∗2, θ∗m2).
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Now this equilibriumwith potential competition can be comparedwith themonopoly
equilibrium. First look at the case where firm 2 enters. In this case fixed costs of
market entry are so low that it does not pay for firm 1 to choose qED1 such that firm
2 does not enter. Instead firm 1 sets q∗1 according to (6).
Proposition 2
q∗1 > q
mon∗
1 if and only if
v < uq1(q
mon∗
1 , θ
∗
m1)− ∂q
∗
2
∂q1
[(uq2(q
∗
2, θ
∗
m1) + uq2(q
∗
2, θ
∗
m2)
−uθ(q∗2, θ∗m2))∂θ
∗
m2
∂q∗2
)]( 1
F (θmon∗m )−F (θ∗m1))
(7)
Proof
qmon∗1 is given by (2),
∂Π1
∂q1
= (1− F (θmon∗m ))(uq1(q1, θmon∗m )− v)− c′(q1) = 0,
while q∗1 is given by (6),
∂Π1
∂q1
= (1− F (θ∗m1))(uq1(q1, θ∗m1)− v − (uq2(q∗2, θ∗m1) + uq2(q∗2, θ∗m2)
−uθ(q∗2, θ∗m2))∂θm2∂q∗2
∂q∗2
∂q1
− c′(q1) = 0.
Evaluated at qmon∗1 , (6) becomes
[F (θmon∗m )− F (θ∗m1)](uq1(qmon∗1 , θ∗m1)− v)−
((uq2(q
∗
2, θ
∗
m1) + uq2(q
∗
2, θ
∗
m2)− uθ(q∗2, θ∗m2)) ∂θ∂q∗2 )
∂q∗2
∂q1
,
which can be greater or smaller than zero. Solving for v yields
uq1(q
mon∗
1 , θ
∗
m1)− [(uq(q∗2, θ∗m1) + uq2(q∗2, θ∗m2)
−uθ(q∗2, θ∗m2)) ∂θ∂q∗2
∂q∗2
∂q1
]
(
1
F (θmon∗m )−F (θ∗m1)
)

>
=
<
 v.
If ′ >′ is true the first derivative of the profit function of firm 1 after
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entry is increasing at qmon∗1 while it is zero at q∗1 . Since the function is
globally concave qmon∗1 < qduo∗1 .
q.e.d.
This shows that the quality level of the incumbent increases after entry if and only
if marginal costs are lower than a given threshold. At first glance one may would
have guessed that the quality level of firm 1 in duopoly is always higher achiev-
ing a higher degree of differentiation from the entrant’s quality. But with high
marginal costs this is not true. The reason is that in case of competition it is harder
for the incumbent to extract consumer rent. Thus it does not pay to produce high
quality if this comes at high costs.
More specifically, let us have a closer look at inequality (7). It is obvious from equa-
tion (2) that uq1(qmon∗1 , θ∗m1) > v. Thus if the term [−∂q
∗
2
∂q1
[(uq2(q
∗
2, θ
∗
m1) + uq2(q
∗
2, θ
∗
m2)
−uθ(q∗2, θ∗m2))∂θ
∗
m2
∂q∗2
)]( 1
F (θmon∗m )−F (θ∗m1))] is greater than zero the right hand side of (7) is
higher than the left hand side and we have q∗1 > qmon∗1 . To get an intuition for the
result suppose that θ∗m1 < θmon∗m (and thus F (θ∗m1) < F (θmon∗m )).18 Then this term is
positive if ∂q
∗
2
∂q1
< 0, i.e. qualities are strategic substitutes. In this case an increase
in q∗1 has a favourable impact for firm 1 on q∗2 , namely a reduction of q∗2 . Thus q∗1
unambiguously increases with competition. If instead ∂q
∗
2
∂q∗1
> 0 the qualities are
strategic complements. In this case it might be optimal for firm 1 to set q∗1 < qmon∗1
to induce firm 2 to lower its quality as well. Firm 1 will do so if variable costs are
high because then costs can be reduced and competition is lowered by the reaction
of firm 2.
To gain some insights into welfare comparisons between monopoly and potential
competition we have to give a bit more structure to the model.
Proposition 3
Let u(q, θ) = θq. If qualities are strategic substitutes welfare unambigu-
ously rises with entry.
18In the next proposition it is shown that this is always the case if u(q, θ) = θq.
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Proof
See the Appendix.
If u(q, θ) = θq firm 1 serves more consumers in duopoly than in monopoly. The
reason is that the quality deflated price p
∗
1
q∗1
is lower.19 This follows from the fact
that θ∗m1 < θmon∗m which for the specific utility function means that
p∗1−p∗2
q∗1−q∗2 <
pmon∗1
qmon∗1
,
and the fact that p
∗
2
q∗2
<
pmon∗1
qmon∗1
. Taken together this implies that p
∗
1
q∗1
<
pmon∗1
qmon∗1
. Thus more
consumers are buying from the incumbent. If its quality in duopoly is higher as
well then welfare in duopoly is for sure higher. This is the case if qualities are
strategic substitutes because then firm 2 reduces its quality as reaction to a quality
increase of firm 1, which is profitable for firm 1. It should be mentioned that if
qualities are strategic substitutes welfare necessarily increases. But the "only if"
statement is not true. Even in case if qualities are strategic complements welfare
can rise because more consumers are buying in duopoly. But it is also possible
that welfare decreases because the incumbent reduces its quality and this quality
reduction effect dominates the effect that more consumers are served.
Now let us turn to the case where firm 1 deters entry of firm 2. In this case firm
1 produces qED1 and is a monopolist thereafter. From Proposition 1 we know that
a monopolist distorts quality downwards. So whether welfare in case of entry
deterrence is higher than welfare in a pure monopoly situation depends on qED1
in comparison with qmon∗1 . If qED1 > (<)qmon∗1 welfare in case of entry deterrence
is higher (lower). But this depends on the reaction of q∗2 on q∗1 . If e.g.
∂q∗2
∂q∗1
< 0 the
incumbent has to increase its quality to keep the entrant out of the market. pmon∗1 is
always given by pmon1 = u(qmon∗1 , θmon∗m ). Thus a change in qmon∗1 leads to a change
in pmon∗1 of uqmon∗1 (q
mon∗
1 , θ
mon∗
m ) but θmon∗m stays unchanged and we get the following
proposition.
Proposition 4
If qualities are strategic substitutes welfare in case of entry deterrence
19This result is obtained in many models of quality competition, see e.g. Bae & Choi (2003) or
Banerjee (2003). In these models quality is exogenous. In the paper here it is shown that this result
holds for endogenous quality choice as well.
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is higher than in a protected monopoly. If qualities are strategic com-
plements the reverse is true.
This shows that the threat of entry can either increase or decrease welfare depend-
ing on the strategic reaction of firm 2 to the quality of firm 1. In the most gen-
eral model it is impossible to assess whether qualities are strategic substitutes or
complements. But we can make a general conclusion in the specific framework
of Mussa & Rosen (1978). In their model θ is uniformly distributed, u(q, θ) = θq,
v = 0, and c(q) = 1
2
q2.
Proposition 5
In the linear-uniform-quadratic case of Mussa & Rosen (1978) qualities
are strategic complements.
Proof
See the Appendix.
So in the uniform-linear-quadratic case welfare decreases with potential entry if
fixed costs from entry are high enough such that entry is deterred. The reason is
that the incumbent distorts its quality further downwards so that it is not profitable
for the entrant to occupy the low quality segment and therefore the entrant stays
out of the market. But this downward distortion of quality lowers welfare. In
Section 5 this result will be contrasted with a model where both firms can produce
many different quality levels.
4 Discussion
The preceding analysis points to cost-and demand-function-based reasons for an
incumbent to increase or decrease its quality and price after entry. In this section
we turn to a discussion of some empirical examples from different markets that
give anecdotal evidence for our results.
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4.1 Pricing of Pharmaceuticals after Generic Entry
In the market for pharmaceuticals, patents protect drug developers after the de-
velopment of a new pharmaceutical. The aim of these patents is to give devel-
oping firms an incentive to develop new pharmaceuticals because they can earn
monopoly rents during the patent period. After the expiry of the patent, entry of
generic drugs is possible. In the US the Watchman-Hax Act in 1984 makes it easier
for generic firms to enter the market.20 This makes the pharmaceutical market a
suitable example for applying the results of the previous section.
By Proposition 2 our theory predicts that if variable marginal costs of production
are low, quality and price of the brand-name drug should increase after entry. In
the production of pharmaceuticals marginal costs are very low compared with
research and development costs. For example, in the US the pharmaceutical in-
dustry has spent the largest fraction of its sales receipts to research and develop-
ment among all US industries with comparable data (US Federal Trade Commis-
sion (1985)). So one would predict that prices increase after generic entry. This is
confirmed by empirical studies. Scherer (2000) gives an example of the expiry of
the product patent covering the cephalosporin antibiotic cephalexin in April 1987.
This was sold under the brand name Keflex. After entry the price of Keflex rose
from around $60 (per 100 capsules) to $85 in 1990. During this time the prices of
generics went down from $30 to $15. Frank & Salkever (1997) looked at 45 drugs
which faced generic competition for the first time after the Watchman-Hax Act.
They found that brand-name prices increased by 50% five years after generic en-
try. Similar pricing patterns were obtained in the studies by Grabowski & Vernon
(1992) and Scherer (1996). This supports the prediction that if variable marginal
costs are low prices will rise after entry.
Rising quality is a bit harder to explain because normally quality of drugs stayed
unchanged. But the brand-name producers tried to increase consumers’ perceived
quality via advertising during the period of patent protection. Scherer (2000) states
20The reason is that testing requirements for generics have been relaxed. It is only necessary
to demonstrate that the drug has the same ingredients as the original, that the formulation was
absorbed in the blood stream at more or less the same time, and to document good manufacturing
practices of the generic firm. See Scherer (2000), p. 1321.
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that in 1998 in the USA producers spend about $1 billion on direct-to-consumer ad-
vertising.21 This amount can not only be seen as informative advertising but is also
done to convince consumers of the product’s quality and to separate from gener-
ics. After entry, advertisement was reduced because of the fear that this would
also spur the sales of the new competitors. Thus in the market for pharmaceuti-
cals brand-name producers did not increase the real quality of the drugs. Instead
they increased perceived quality when faced with the threat of entry.
4.2 The Market for Fragrance and Cosmetics
In Singapore for a long time cosmetics were sold exclusively by authorised distrib-
utors and listed retailers. These firms demand high prices and had high price-cost
margins. For example, consumers had to pay $35 to $38 for a lipstick at cosmetic
counters of department stores but it costs only US $0.50 to manufacture a lipstick.22
These lipsticks are imported from the US or Europe so one had to add transporta-
tion costs. Still price cost margins were high.
In the late 1980s the parallel importer B&N entered the market. B&N imported the
same products as the authorised distributors but had a simple business strategy,
namely price cuts. It sold a Christian Dior lipstick at $19 or $2023 and in general of-
fered the cosmetics up to 50% below the prices of listed retailers. The products are
qualitatively similar but disadvantages for B&N were that the company was un-
known at the beginning of their business and that authorised distributors placed
their products on premium space and had set up cosmetic counters at department
stores. What was the reaction of distributors to the entry of B&N? Beside negative
advertising about parallel imports and lawsuits their main response consisted in
price cuts. For example they lowered the lipstick price from $34 to $28.24
In contrast to the pharmaceutical market in the market for fragrance and cosmetics
marginal costs play the important role compared to development costs. The only
source of development costs is the building up of connections to importers. But
21See also Caves, Whinston & Hurwitz (1991).
22See Lee, Lim & Tan (2001).
23"Parallel Importers Make Cosmetic Firms See Red", The Straits Time, October 7, 1994, p.44.
24"Parallel Imports: Copyright Owners Fight Back", The Straits Time, August 12, 1996, p.31.
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the main bulk of costs a retailer has to bear are the delivering costs of lipsticks,
the advertising costs, and the rents to be paid to department stores for display on
premium space. In this respect the retailers also reduced the quality of their offers.
They set up fewer cosmetic counters in stores and spend less money on costly ad-
vertising.25 But especially with cosmetics and fragrance the conveyed life-style of
the products is very important and this can be mainly given by advertising. Since
the retailers do not manufacture the cosmetics themselves the physical quality if
the products stays the same. But the quality was reduced from the perspective of
the consumers since the products are no longer displayed on premium space and
are less advertised. Thus the observations in this market go in line with the pre-
dictions of our theory that an incumbent’s price and quality decrease if marginal
variable costs are high.
5 The Model with Price Discrimination
This section analyses a model where firms can produce many different qualities
which can be sold at different prices. The results of this model are later compared
with the results of Section 3.
5.1 Model Framework
Consumers’ utility functions, the distribution of preferences, firms’ cost functions,
and the game structure is the same as in Section 3. The only difference is that each
firm can now produce not only one quality but many different qualities which
are sold at different prices. We are therefore in a problem of adverse selection.
We assume that for each quality a firm produces it has to bear development costs
c(q)26 and variable costs v. Assumptions A1, A2, and A3 are kept as well.
25See Lee, Lim & Tan (2001).
26Theoretically the assumption of development costs for each quality is necessary to avoid that
firm 1 can commit costless to the whole range of qualities. If this is possible we get trivial equilibria
in which firm 2 is always kept out of the market.
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5.2 Monopoly Situation
As in Section 3 before solving the game consider the benchmark case where firm
1 is a monopolist. In this case we are in a standard mechanism design problem of
second-degree price discrimination. The firm’s problem is to choose the optimal
quality-payment schedule and the marginal consumer θmonm subject to the standard
participation and incentive compatibility constraints,
maxq(θ),p(θ),θmonm Π1 =
∫ 1
θmonm
[p(θ)− vq(θ)]f(θ)dθ − ∫ 1θmonm c(q)dθ
s.t. u(q(θ), θ)− p(θ) ≥ 0 ∀θ ≥ θmonm
u(q(θ), θ)− p(θ) ≥ u(q(θˆ), θ)− p(θˆ) ∀θ, θˆ ≥ θmonm .
The equilibrium is characterised in the following lemma:
Lemma 1
The optimal q(θ)mon?, p(θ)mon?, θmon?m are given by the following equa-
tions:
pmon?(θ) = u(qmon?(θ), θ)−
∫ θ
θmon?m
∂u(qmon?(τ), τ)
∂θ
dτ, (8)
∂u(qmon?(θ), θ)
∂q
−
(1− F (θ)
f(θ)
)∂2u(qmon?(θ), θ)
∂q∂θ
−v− c
′(qmon?(θ))
f(θ)
= 0, (9)
[u(qmon?(θmon?m ), θ
mon?
m )− vqmon?(θmon?m )]f(θmon?m )− c(qmon?(θ))
= (1− F (θmon?m ))∂u(q
mon?(θmon?m ),θ
?
m)
∂θmon?m
.
(10)
Proof
See the Appendix.
The first two equations are standard in second degree price discrimination. The
first states that the price for each type θ is the utility type θ gets from buying a
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good of quality qmon?(θ)minus a term which is increasing in θ. So higher types get
a higher utility to prevent them from choosing the contract designed for the lower
types. The second equation states that the quality a type θ gets is increasing in θ but
is always lower than the optimal quality except for θ = 1. This is the famous ’no-
distortion-at-the-top-result’. The third equation states that the marginal consumer
is characterised in such a way that the net gain of serving him (the left hand side
of (10)) is exactly equal to the loss that occurs to the firm because it has to give a
higher rent to the inframarginal consumers (the right hand side of (10)).
Concerning welfare the firm offers a whole range of qualities where higher types
get higher quality. But except for the highest type quality is distorted downwards.
5.3 Analysis of the Duopoly Situation
In the following we denote the quality range of firm 1Q1 = [q−1 , q
+
1 ] and the quality
range of firm 2 Q2 = [q−2 , q
+
2 ]. Q2(Q1), as in Section 3, is the best response of firm
2 after entry if firm 1 produces a quality range Q1. If the quality ranges do not
overlap, i.e. the lowest quality of firm i, q−i , is higher than the highest quality of
firm j, q+j , we say that Qi > Qj .27
Again before starting with the analysis of the entry game we make two assump-
tions which are modifications of assumptions A4 and A5 of Section 3.
A4′ : Π2(Qmon1 , Q2(Q
mon
1 )) > 0.
Qmon1 is the quality range firm 1 produces in the monopoly case and A4′ states that
firm 2 enters if firm 1 produces Qmon1 .
A5′ : Π1(QH1 , Q2(Q
H
1 )) > Π1(Q
L
1 , Q2(Q
L
1 ))
whenever QH1 > Q2(QH1 ) and QL1 < Q2(QL1 ).
Assumption A5′ states that it is profitable for firm 1 to be the high quality firm, i.e.
producing a quality range which is above the one of firm 2.
27In Lemma 2 we show that in equilibrium this is always the case.
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Again the game is solved by backwards induction. First look at the case where firm
2 did not enter in stage 2. By the same calculations as in the monopoly case we get
that prices are p?(θ) = u(q(θ), θ) − ∫ θθ?m ∂u(q(τ),τ)∂θ dτ . This prices are independent of
the ends of the quality range firm 1 has produced in stage 1.
Now let us turn to the case where firm 2 entered in stage 2.28 We have to determine
the prices given that firm 1 produces quality range Q1 and firm 2 produces quality
range Q2.29
For simplicity let us assume first that q−1 > q
+
2 . We will later show that this is
always the case. The marginal consumer θm who is indifferent between buying
q−1 and q
+
2 is given by u(q
−
1 , θm) − p1(θ(q−1 )) = u(q+2 , θm) − p2(θ(q+2 )) or p1(θ(q−1 )) =
p2(θ(q
+
2 )) + u(q
−
1 , θm)− u(q+2 , θm). Firm 1’s maximisation problem in stage 3 can be
written as
maxp1(θ),p1(q−1 ) Π1 =
∫ 1
θ(q−1 )
[p1(θ)− vq(θ)]f(θ)d(θ)+∫ θ(q−1 )
θm
[p1(q
−
1 )− vq−1 ]f(θ)dθ −
∫ 1
θ(q−1 )
c(q(θ))dθ
s.t. u(q(θ), θ)− p1(θ) ≥ u(q+2 , θ)− p2(q+2 ) ∀θ ≥ θm
u(q(θ), θ)− p1(θ) ≥ u(q(θˆ), θ)− p1(θˆ) ∀θ, θˆ ≥ θm,
where θ(q−1 ) is the highest type who buys quality q
−
1 .
Firm 2’s maximisation problem in stage 3 is
maxp2(θ),p2(q+2 ) Π2 =
∫ θ(q+2 )
θm2
[p2(θ)− vq(θ)]f(θ)d(θ)
+
∫ θm
θ(q+2 )
[p2(q
+
2 )− vq+2 ]f(θ)dθ −
∫ θ(q+2 )
θm2
c(q(θ))dθ
s.t. u(q(θ), θ)− p2(θ) ≥ u(q−1 , θ)− p1(q−1 ) ∀θ < θm
u(q(θ), θ)− p2(θ) ≥ u(q(θˆ), θ)− p2(θˆ) ∀θ, θˆ < θm,
where θ(q+2 ) is the lowest type who buys quality q
+
2 .
28The analysis in this section draws heavily on Champsaur & Rochet (1989). The difference is that
firms choose qualities simultaneously in Champsaur & Rochet (1989) while in my model qualities
are chosen sequentially. But the analysis of the second and the third stage is quite similar.
29In principle we should analyse the third stage for arbitrary (Q1, Q2). However, this is clearly
impossible to do. But one can put the restriction on (Q1, Q2) that there is never a whole in one of
two quality ranges for the same reason as for the monopolist. For a discussion on that issue and
why it is reasonable to conduct the analysis in the way as it is done in this chapter see Champsaur
& Rochet (1989).
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Solving for p1(θ) and p2(θ) yields for the same reasons as in Lemma 4.1
p1(θ) = u(q(θ), θ)−
∫ θ
θ(q−1 )
∂u(q(τ), τ)
∂θ
dτ + p1(q
−
1 )− u(q−1 , θ(q−1 )), (11)
and
p2(θ) = u(q(θ), θ)−
∫ θ
θm2
∂u(q(τ), τ)
∂θ
dτ + p2(q
+
2 )− u(q+2 , θ(q+2 )). (12)
Plugging this back in the profit function and solving for p1(q−1 ) and p2(q
+
2 ) gives
p∗1(q
−
1 ) = vq
−
1 +
1− F (θm)
f(θm)
[uθ(q
−
1 , θm)− uθ(q+2 , θm)], (13)
p∗2(q
+
2 ) = vq
+
2 +
F (θm)− F (θm2)
f(θm)
[uθ(q
−
1 , θm)− uθ(q+2 , θm)]. (14)
Having solved stage 3 of the game we can go back one stage to stage 2 where firm
2 chooses its optimal quality range. The problem of firm 2 is thus
maxq(θ),q+2 ,θm2 Π2 =
∫ θ(q+2 )
θm2
[u(q(θ), θ)− ∫ θθm2 ∂u(q(τ),τ)∂θ dτ
+p∗2(q
+
2 )− u(q+2 , θ(q+2 ))− vq(θ)− c(q(θ))f(θ) ]f(θ)d(θ)+∫ θm
θ(q+2 )
[p∗2(q
+
2 )− vq+2 ]f(θ)dθ.
Differentiating with respect to θm2 and q(θ) yields
(F (θm)− F (θm2))(∂u(q?(θ?m),θ?m)∂θ?m )−
f(θm2)
f(θm)
[uθ(q
−
1 , θm)− uθ(q+2 , θm)] =
f(θm2)[u(q(θm2), θm2)− c(q(θm2))f(θm2) + p∗2(q+2 )− u(q+2 , θ(q+2 ))− vq(θm2)]
(15)
and
∂u(q?(θ),θ)
∂q
−
(
1−F (θ)
f(θ)
)
∂2u(q?(θ),θ)
∂q∂θ
− v − c′(q∗(θ))
f(θ)
= 0,
∀θ with θ(q+2 ) > θ ≥ θm2.
(16)
Before differentiating with respect to q+2 it is helpful to decompose the profit func-
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tion as Champsaur & Rochet (1989) do. Inserting p∗2(q
+
2 ) in Π2 yields
Π2 =
(F (θm)−F (θm2))2
f(θm)
[uθ(q
−
1 , θm)− uθ(q+2 , θm)]+∫ θ(q+2 )
θm2
[u(q(θ), θ))− ∫ θθm2 ∂u(q(τ),τ)∂θ dτ − u(q+2 , θ(q+2 ))−
vq(θ) + vq+2 − c(q(θ))f(θ) ]]f(θ)d(θ).
(17)
The first term is dependent on q−1 and q
+
2 while the second term (the integral term)
is independent of q−1 .30 In the following we denote the integral term by I(q
+
2 ). This
decomposition also shows that q+2 is only dependent on q
−
1 but not on the other
qualities firm 1 produces. The first order condition for q+2 is thus given by
−(F (θm)− F (θm2))
2
f(θm)
uθq(q
+
2 , θm) +
∂I(q+2 )
∂q
= 0 (18)
It is now possible to show that q+2 < q
−
1 .
Lemma 2
There is always a gap between the quality ranges of firm 1 and firm 2.
Proof
See the Appendix.
This result is different to Champsaur & Rochet (1989). If firms decide simultane-
ously about their qualities there can be equilibria where the quality ranges overlap
and firms make zero profits with these overlapping qualities.31
We can get an additional result. Differentiating equation (17) with respect to q−1 we
get by using the Envelope Theorem
∂Π2
∂q−1
=
(F (θm)− F (θm2))2
f(θm)
uθq(q
−
1 , θm) > 0, (19)
where the inequality comes from the Single Crossing Property.
30Champsaur & Rochet (1989) call the first term pure differentiation profit and the second term
pure segmentation profit.
31Champsaur & Rochet (1989) assume that there are no development costs, i.e. c(q) = 0. If such
development costs exists firms would make losses with overlapping qualities and they may decide
not to produce them even in the simultaneous move game. Despite this, in the sequential move
game even if c(q) = 0 product ranges would never overlap.
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So firm 2’s profit is increasing if firm 2 produces a smaller quality range. But this
also implies that ∂q
+
2
∂q−1
> 0 so the lowest quality of firm 1 and the highest quality of
firm 2 are strategic complements. Firm 1 will take this into account in its decision
of Q1 in stage 1.
Let us now turn to stage 1. As in Section 3 firm 1 has two possibilities either to
accommodate entry or to deter entry. Let us look at each case in turn. If fixed costs
are low firm 1 finds it optimal to accommodate entry. Decomposing firm 1’s profit
function in the same way as firm 2’s profit function before we get a maximisation
problem of
maxq(θ),q−1 Π1 =
(1−F (θm))2
f(θm)
[uθ(q
−
1 , θm)− uθ(q+2 , θm)]+∫ 1
θ(q−1 )
[u(q(θ), θ))− ∫ θθ(q−1 ) ∂u(q(τ),τ)∂θ dτ − u(q−1 , θ(q−1 ))
−vq(θ) + vq−1 − c(q(θ))f(θ) ]]f(θ)d(θ).
In the following we call the integral term I(q−1 ).
We get two first order conditions
∂u(q?(θ),θ)
∂q
−
(
1−F (θ)
f(θ)
)
∂2u(q?(θ),θ)
∂q∂θ
− v − c′(q∗(θ))
f(θ)
= 0,
∀θ with θ(q−1 ) ≤ θ ≤ 1.
(20)
and
−1− F (θm))
2
f(θm)
(uθq(q
−
1 , θm)− uθq(q+2 , θm)
∂q+2
∂q−1
) +
∂I(q−1 )
∂q
= 0. (21)
From the first of these two equations it is apparent that all types θ(q−1 ) ≤ θ ≤ 1 get
the same quality as in monopoly because this equation coincides with equation
(9). All types θm ≤ θ < θ(q−1 ) get a higher quality because they buy q−1 which is
above q(θ) in the monopoly case given by equation (9).
The term uθq(q+2 , θm)
∂q+2
∂q−1
in equation (21) is greater than zero because we know
that ∂q
+
2
∂q−1
> 0. This expresses that with a change in q−1 firm 1 can change firm 2’s
reaction in stage 2. In the model of Champsaur & Rochet (1989) this term does not
exist because qualities are chosen simultaneously. Thus the incumbent produces a
larger quality range than with a simultaneous quality choice to shift firm 2’s upper
quality downwards.
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Let us now look at the case where firm 1 deters entry of firm 2. From equation (17)
we know that q+2 does only depend on q
−
1 and from equation (19) ∂Π2∂q−1
> 0. So if
firm 1 wants to deter entry it has to enlarge its quality range compared with the
monopoly situation. The intuition is straightforward. There is less space in the
product range left for firm 2 because firm 1 has occupied more quality levels and
if fixed entry costs F are high enough firm 2 founds it not profitable to enter. Let
us denote the quality range Q1 which deters entry by QED1 = [qED1 , q
+
1 ] where QED1
is given by Π2(QED1 , Q2(QED1 )) = 0.
We are now in a position to describe the equilibrium of the game:
• If ΠED1 > Πduo1 thenQ∗1 = [qED1 , q+1 ], where q∗(θ) is given by (9), firm 2 does not
enter in stage 2 and prices are given by p?(θ) = u(q?(θ), θ)− ∫ θθEDm ∂u(q?(τ),τ)∂θ dτ .
• If ΠED1 ≤ Πduo1 then Q∗1 = [q−1 , q+1 ] where q∗(θ) is given by (20), q−1 is given by
(21). Firm 2 enters in stage 2 and produces a quality range of Q∗2 = [q
−
2 , q
+
2 ]
where q∗(θ) is given by (16), q+2 is given by (18) and θ∗m2 is given by (15). Prices
of the firm are given by (11), (12), (13), and (14).
This equilibrium can be comparedwith themonopoly outcomewith regard to con-
sumer rent and welfare. First we analyse the case where firm 2 enters. Comparing
welfare of market entry with welfare under pure monopoly we get the following
proposition.
Proposition 6
Welfare in case of market entry is higher than under monopoly if and
only if
∫ θ(q−1 )
θduo∗m
[u(q−1 , θ(q
−
1 ))− u(q(θ), θ)− vq−1 + vq(θ) + c(q(θ))f(θ) ]f(θ)dθ − c(q−1 )− F
+
∫ θmon∗m
θ∗m2
[u(q(θ), θ)− vq(θ)− c(q(θ))
f(θ)
]f(θ)dθ
>
∫ θduo∗m
θ(q+2 )
[u(q(θ), θ)− u(q+2 , θ(q+2 ) + vq−1 − vq(θ)− c(q(θ))f(θ) ]f(θ)dθ + c(q+2 ).
(22)
Proof
See the Appendix.
Vertical Product Differentiation, Market Entry, and Welfare 28
If firm 2 enters some consumers stay with firm 1, others switch to firm 2, while a
third group which has not bought in monopoly does now buy from firm 2. Types
θ with θ(q−1 ) ≤ θ < 1 stay at firm 1 and get the same quality as in monopoly. This
can be seen from the first order conditions of the quality maximisation, (9) and
(20). Consumers between θduo∗m and θ(q
−
1 ) are consuming higher quality in duopoly,
namely q−1 , than in monopoly. This leads to a rise in welfare. But consumers be-
tween θduo∗m and θ(q
+
2 ) are now getting a lower quality, q
+
2 , than in monopoly be-
cause they buy from firm 2. Consumers with a θ below θ(q+2 ) but above θmon∗m buy
the same quality as before since equations (9) and (16) coincide. Customer types
θmon∗m > θ ≥ θ∗m2 have not bought in monopoly but are buying now from firm 2.
Thus we have two sources for a welfare increase, namely that more consumers are
served and that types between θduo∗m and θ(q
−
1 ) buy higher quality. But there are
two sources for a welfare loss as well, namely that types between θ(q+2 ) and θduo∗m
buy lower quality and the fixed costs of entry F . The overall effect on welfare is
therefore ambiguous.
But we can say more about consumer rent.
Proposition 7
Consumer rent in case ofmarket entry is always higher than inmonopoly.
Proof
See the Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is simple. In monopoly the marginal consumer
θmon∗m gets zero rent. But in duopoly there is competition for this consumer. Thus
he gets a positive utility. But because the incentive compatibility constraints have
to be satisfied this leads to an increase of the rents for all types above. Since more
consumers are served in duopoly utility for the types below θmon∗m weakly increases
as well.
Now let us turn to the case where firm 1 deters entry. As was already mentioned
firm 1 deters entry by enlarging its product line and producing more qualities than
in the monopoly case. So more people are served. But since the incentive compat-
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ibility constraints must be satisfied this results in lower prices for all consumers
who bought already in the monopoly case. Thus we get the following proposition.
Proposition 8
If the incumbent can produce a range of qualities welfare and con-
sumer rent in case of entry deterrence are higher than in case of pure
monopoly.
The proof is omitted.
This result can be contrasted with the result of Section 3 where firms can produce
only one quality level. If in that case qualities are strategic complements welfare in
case of entry deterrence is lower because the incumbent distorts its quality down-
wards. In case of price discrimination the lowest quality of the incumbent and the
highest one of the entrant are strategic complements. This results in an enlarge-
ment of the quality range in the segment of low qualities and increases welfare.
The rent for every consumer who buys is higher than in monopoly as well because
only the marginal one gets zero utility and prices for the ’old’ consumers are lower
to prevent them from buying lower qualities.
It is also interesting to investigate under which conditions it is more profitable for
an incumbent to deter entry than to accommodate entry.
Proposition 9
There exists a threshold value v′. If v < v′ the incumbent deters entry,
if v ≥ v′ entry is accommodated.
Proof
The incumbent’s profit if entry is deterred is given by
ΠED1 =
∫ 1
θm(qED1 )
[u(q(θ), θ)− vq(θ)−
∫ θ
θEDm
∂u(q?(τ), τ)
∂θ
dτ − c(q(θ))
f(θ)
]f(θ)dθ.
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If entry is accommodated profit is given by
Πduo1 =
∫ θ(q−1 )
θduom
[1−F (θm)
f(θm)
][uθ(q
−
1 , θm)− uθ(q+2 , θm)]f(θ)dθ+∫ 1
θ(q−1 )
[u(q(θ), θ))− ∫ θθ(q−1 ) ∂u(q(τ),τ)∂θ dτ − u(q−1 , θ(q−1 ))− c(q(θ))f(θ) −
vq(θ) + vq−1 +
1−F (θm)
f(θm)
[uθ(q
−
1 , θm)− uθ(q+2 , θm)− c(q(θ))f(θ) ]f(θ)d(θ).
Thus entry is deterred if ΠED1 > Πduo1 . Rearranging terms yields
∫ θ(q−1 )
θED1
[u(q(θ), θ))− ∫ θθ(q−1 ) ∂u(q(τ),τ)∂θ dτ − vq(θ)− c(q(θ))f(θ) ]f(θ)d(θ)
+
∫ 1
θ(q−1 )
[u(q−1 , θ(q
−
1 ))− vq−1 − c(q(θ))f(θ) − 1−F (θm)f(θm) [uθ(q−1 , θm)− uθ(q+2 , θm)]f(θ)d(θ)
≥ ∫ 1θ(q−1 )[1−F (θm)f(θm) ][uθ(q−1 , θm)− uθ(q+2 , θm)]f(θ)dθ.
The right hand side is independent of v while the left hand side is
strictly decreasing in v. Thus there exists a value v′ below which the
left hand side is higher and above which the right hand side is higher.
q.e.d.
Thus if v is small the incumbent deters entry. The intuition is that in order to
deter entry the incumbent has to enlarge its product line. This is costly for him.
But if costs are small it pays the incumbent to bear these costs to enjoy monopoly
power afterwards. If instead costs are high this enlargement is not profitable. The
incumbent reduces its product line to save on costs but faces competition from the
entrant. In the next section we provide two examples that seem to fit very well
with the results of our theory.
6 Empirical Examples
As in Section 4 in this section we present two empirical examples from different
industries that seem to resonate well with our theory.
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6.1 Airline Industry
In Europe deregulation of the air transportation market started in the late 1980’s
and lasted till 1993. The European Council of Ministers decided to launch three
’liberalisation packages’ but only the last one which was launched in 1993 really
caused market liberalisation. After this package each airline was allowed to offer
services with no restrictions either on prices or on routes.32
One of the most striking developments of this deregulation was the entry of the so
called ’no-frills’-airlines or low cost carriers starting in summer 1995with Ryanair.33
These low cost carriers offer little or no services but demand prices which are very
cheap.34 Also the low cost carriers mainly fly to secondary airports like Stansted
instead of Heathrow in London or Frankfurt-Hahn instead of Frankfurt. So the
quality of these low cost carriers is obviously below that of the established air-
lines.
Usually all established airlines engage in second degree price discrimination. So
there can be two possible reactions of the established airlines to this entry threat.
They can either expand their quality range to deter entry in the low quality seg-
ment or accommodate entry and reduce their quality range to lessen competition.
From Proposition 4.9 we would predict that if variable costs are high the reaction
would be a contraction of the quality range while if costs are low entry would be
deterred by introducing an own low cost carrier. In the airline industry there are
examples of both practices.
On long-haul routes the U.K. carrier British Airways focused on the business trav-
eller segment and reduced its quality range.35 The aim of British Airways was to
offer premium services and facilities to charge higher prices and attract a higher
number of business travellers. The segment of the leisure travellers was given
away to the low cost carriers.
On short-haul routes costs are to some extent cheaper than on long-haul routes.
32See Doganis (2001).
33For an extensive overview of low cost carriers in Europe see Gilroy, Lukas, & Volpart (2003).
34Recently there was an offer of Ryanair to fly from Salzburg (Austria) to London with return
flight for 1 Cent. Although the time of the flight was not attractive it is hard to imagine such an
offer five years ago.
35See Johnson & Myatt (2003), p. 708.
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For example, on intercontinental flights by regulation three or four pilots are needed
instead of only two as on continental flights and also more board personnel. This
results in higher personnel costs. After a long-haul flight an airline is obliged to
maintain the aircraft because the engine has worked for a long time and the risk of
a crash is increased.36 This causes fewer capacity utilization of a long-haul plane
and therefore higher costs. As predicted by our theory the strategy of many estab-
lished airlines on short-haul routes was very different than the one on long-haul
routes. As an example we take the case of Lufthansa in Germany. In October 2002
the low cost carrier Germanwings was founded which is an affiliate company of
Eurowings. In turn, Lufthansa holds 24.9% of Eurowings and has the option to en-
large its share up to 49%.37 Germanwings operates mainly on routes in Germany
which are offered by Lufthansa as well. So the foundation of Germanwings can
be seen as an entry deterrence strategy of Lufthansa to occupy the lower market
segment and to deter entry of competing low cost carriers.38
A different interpretation for the introduction of a low cost carrier by an estab-
lished airline is given by Johnson & Myatt (2003). They argue that these low cost
carriers are introduced as fighting brands to other competitive low cost airlines.
Without entry of these competitors the subsidiary would not have been founded
because of negative effects on core operations but after entry the low quality seg-
ment is opened and the established airline finds it profitable to enter. This might
be true in case of GO which was purchased by Easyjet in 2002. But in case of
Lufthansa, Germanwings was clearly introduced to deter entry of other low cost
airlines and up to now no independent low cost airline has entered the German
market.
6.2 Brand-Controlled Generics in the Pharmaceutical Market
In Subsection 4.1 we gave some evidence that prices of brand-name drugs in-
creased after the entry of generics. However, some patent-holding firms pursued
36See Doganis (2001).
37See Gilroy, Lukas, & Volpert (2003).
38Asmentioned in the introduction a similar strategy was pursued by British Airways and KLM.
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a different strategy namely to introduce a ’branded generic’, i.e. the same drug
under a different label. These branded generics were introduced shortly before
patent expiration and were priced below the prices of the branded drugs. Hol-
lis (2003) reports that the success of these branded generics in Canada was very
impressive. While in the 1980’s they had only a tiny share of total generic sales
this share has grown to 34.6% in 1999 which is an amount in money terms of ap-
proximately $500 million.39 The reason was obviously to deter entry of generic
competitors as Scherer (2000) states:
In this way they (brand-name firms) gained a "first mover advantage"
in the generic market, secured the leading share of generic sales, and
perhaps thereby discouraged some would-be generic suppliers from
entering and driving prices even lower.
However, not all brand name producers introduced these pseudo-generics. In the
US a study of the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (1998) reports that among 112
drugs with generic competition only 13 sold its own generic products. But this is
in line with the predictions of our theory that not all firms expand their product
line to deter entry but only those with low costs. In Canada in the 1990’s, Altimed,
a joint venture of three brand-name firms, was created. The purpose of this joint
venture was to sell branded generics. For this three firms after the joint venture it
was easily and cheaply possible to sell generics. In contrast, in the US such a joint
venture was not created so brand name pharmaceutical firms have to bear higher
costs of introducing their own generics.40 This might be a reason why many of
them found it profitable to accommodate entry of generic competitors.
7 Conclusion
The reactions of incumbents on entry threats are very different. Some firms ac-
commodate entry and prune their product line while others deter entry and ex-
39See Hollis (2003).
40An important source for these costs is the fear of destroying the brand name. This fear was not
by present in case of Altimed because it emerged as an own brand rapidly.
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pand their product line. In the single quality case post-entry prices of incumbents
in some markets are higher than pre-entry prices while in other markets they are
lower.
This paper analysed a model of vertical product differentiation where an incum-
bent and an entrant can either produce a single quality or a quality range. We
show that in the single quality case the behaviour of the incumbent depends on
the cost function and on the nature of strategic competition (whether qualities are
strategic complements or strategic substitutes). We have shown that if qualities are
strategic complements the incumbent deters entry by reducing its quality which
leads to a welfare loss compared with monopoly. In case of entry accommodation
quality might be lowered as well to cause a quality reduction of the entrant and
reduce price competition. With low marginal costs quality of the incumbent in-
creases after entry which results in a welfare gain. Also if qualities are strategic
substitutes the incumbent increases its quality to differentiate itself from the en-
trant. If firms can produce a quality range the results are different. To deter entry
the incumbent has to enlarge its quality range and this leads to a welfare increase.
If entry is accommodated the consequences on welfare are not clear because some
consumers buy a higher quality while others buy a lower one.
We have not provided a substantial empirical analysis but have given examples
from different industries that seem to fit well with the predictions of our theory.
Since we relate the results to firm’s cost functions which are observable in many
industries we give predictions which are potentially testable.
To conclude the paper we want to discuss some policy implications resulting from
our theory. Let us first look at the case where production of a quality range is pos-
sible. In this case we find that the effects on welfare are positive in case of entry de-
terrence and unclear in case of entry accommodation but consumer rent increases
in both cases.41 This leads to the conclusion that deregulation and potential entry
have positive consequences in industries in which it is possible to produce a qual-
41We have not done a welfare comparison between the case of entry deterrence and entry ac-
commodation. This is an interesting topic for further research because it can provide some policy
implications, e.g. if it should be allowed for incumbents to establish a subsidiary brand which
produces a downgrade version of the product.
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ity range. Thus governments should pursue the policy of free market entry and
reduce legal barriers like it was done in the deregulation of the airline industry in
the US and Europe.
The effects in the single quality case are not so clear. Whether welfare increases
with potential entry depends heavily on the nature of competition. But normally
it is hard to assess if products are strategic complements or substitutes. Thus gov-
ernments should be careful in deregulating such markets because potential com-
petition does not necessarily lead to a welfare gain.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We first show that the monopolist provides too low quality.
Welfare is given by
WF =
∫ 1
θWFm
[u(q, θ)− vq]f(θ)dθ − c(q).
For a given q welfare is maximised if
∂WF
∂θWFm
= u(q, θWFm )− vq = 0. (23)
In monopoly θmonm is given by
u(q, θmonm )− vq =
1− F (θmonm )
f(θmonm )
uθ(q, θ
mon
m ). (24)
The left hand side of equation (24) is greater 0 while it is 0 in equation (23). Since
uθ(q, θ
mon
m ) > 0 it follows that θWFm < θmonm . Thus for a given q the monopolist serves
too few consumers.
Maximising welfare with respect to quality yields
∂
∫ 1
θWFm
[u(q, θ)f(θ)dθ]
∂q
= (1− F (θWFm ))v + c′(q). (25)
The equivalent formula for the monopolist is
(1− F (θmonm ))(uq(q, θmonm )− v) = c′(q). (26)
If both qualities were the same we can solve both equations (25) and (26) for c(q)
and get
∂
∫ 1
θWFm
[u(q, θ)f(θ)dθ]
∂q
− (1− F (θWFm ))v = (1− F (θmonm ))(uq(q, θmonm )− v).
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This can be written as
∂
∫ 1
θmonm
[(u(q, θ)− u(q, θmonm ))f(θ)dθ]
∂q
+
∂
∫ θmonm
θWFm
[u(q, θ)f(θ)dθ]
∂q
= (F (θmonm )−F (θWFm ))v.
The second term on the left hand side is the increase in utility for all consumers
between θmonm and θWFm from a marginal increase in q. The term on the right hand
side is the increase in variable costs if consumers between θmonm and θWFm are served.
Thus the second term on the left hand side must be higher than the right hand side
because otherwise it would not have been welfare maximising to serve consumers
between θmonm and θWFm . Since the first term on the left hand side is positive as well
we get that the first order condition for qWF is positive at qmon. Thus qWF > qmon.
Turning back to the comparison of marginal consumers we have shown in equa-
tions (23) and (24) that if qWF = qmon then θWFm < θmonm . But now we know that
qWF > qmon. A comparison of the left hand sides of (23) and (24) shows that for
θWFm = θ
mon
m the left hand side of (23) is higher. But since the right hand side of (24)
is higher it follows that θWFm < θmonm .
q.e.d.
8.2 Proof of Proposition 3
If u(q, θ) = θq the marginal consumer in the monopoly case is given by θmqmon1 −
pmon1 = 0 or θm = pmon1 /qmon1 . This yields a first order condition for θm of
1− F (θmonm )− f(θmonm )(θmonm − v) = 0.
In duopoly the marginal consumer θduom1 who is indifferent between buying from
firm 1 and buying from firm 2 is given by θduom1 q1 − p1 = θduom1 q2 − p2 or θduom1 = p1−p2q1−q2 .
The first order condition for the incumbent is then
F
(
p1 − p2
q1 − q2
)
− f
(
p1 − p2
q1 − q2
)
p2 − vq2
q1 − q2 − F
(
p2
q2
)
− f
(
p2
q2
)(
p2
q2
− v
)
= 0
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or
1− F (θ∗m1)− f(θ∗m1)(θ∗m1 −
p2 − v
q1 − q2 ) = 0. (27)
Evaluating (27) at θmon∗m yields
vq2 − p2 < 0.
Since the profit function is globally concave in θ this shows that θmon∗m > θ∗m1 so
more consumers are buying from firm 1 in duopoly.
Now we know that F (θmon∗m ) > F (θ∗m1). Thus the term
1
F (θmon∗m )−F (θ∗m1) on the right
hand side in inequality (7) is positive. If qualities are strategic substitutes, dq
∗
2
dq1
< 0,
the right hand side of inequality (7) is always higher than the left hand side since
v < uq1(q
mon∗
1 , θ
∗
m1). It follows that q∗1 > qmon∗1 .
Up to nowwe have shown that in duopoly quality of the incumbent is higher than
in monopoly and that in duopoly more consumers are served by the incumbent.
Because firm 2 is present as well there are some people who are not consuming in
monopoly but consume in duopoly from firm 2. So the only source for a welfare
loss can be the fixed costs F . But firm 2 only enters if Π2 > 0. Since p∗2 = u(q∗2, θ∗m2),
Π2 must be lower than the welfare gain because consumers between θ∗m2 and θ∗m1
still get a rent. Thus the welfare gain which is induced by firm 2 is higher than F.
Altogether welfare must have been increased.
q.e.d.
8.3 Proof of Proposition 5
Let us look at the case θ uniformly distributed, u(q, θ) = θq, v = 0, and c(q) = 1
2
q2.
Solving the first order conditions in the third stage of the game, equations (3) and
(4), we get
p1 =
2q1(q1 − q2)
4q1 − q2 p2 =
q2(q1 − q2
4q1 − q2 .
Inserting these values in the first order condition of firm 2 in stage 2, we get from
equation (5)
2q1−q2
4q1−q2 − q1−q24q1−q2 (2q1−q24q1−q2 −
6q21
(4q1−q2)2 )
+ q1−q2
4q1−q2 (
−q1
4q1−q2 +
6q21
(4q1−q2)2 )− q2 = 0.
Vertical Product Differentiation, Market Entry, and Welfare 39
Simplifying and totally differentiating yields
dq1[64q
2
1(1− q2) + 2q22(2− q2) + q1q2(64q2 − 50)]
= dq2[64q
2
1(q1 − q2) + 25q21 + 36q1q22 − 4q2(q1 + q22)].
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Both terms in brackets are always positive since q1 > q2. Thus we get dq2dq1 > 0.
q.e.d.
8.4 Proof of Lemma 1
The first step in this proof is to replace the incentive compatibility constraint
u(q(θ), θ)− p(θ) ≥ u(q(θˆ), θ)− p(θˆ) ∀θ, θˆ ≥ θmonm
by
dq(θ)
dθ
≥ 0 ∀θ ∈ [θmonm , 1] (28)
and
∂u(q(θ), θ)
∂q
dq(θ)
dθ
+
dp(θ)
dθ
= 0 ∀θ ∈ [θmonm , 1]. (29)
This step is a standard one in the theory of adverse selection and the proof of it
can be found in many textbooks. See e.g. Fudenberg & Tirole (1991, chapter 7) or
Schmidt (1995, chapter 4).
We know that U(θ) = u(q(θ), θ)− p(θ).
Using (29) we get
dU(θ)
dθ
=
∂u(q(θ), θ)
∂q
dq(θ)
dθ
+
∂u(q(θ), θ)
∂θ
+
dp(θ)
dθ
=
∂u(q(θ), θ)
∂θ
.
Integrating both sides of this equation yields
U(θ) = U(θmonm ) +
∫ θ
θmonm
∂u(q(τ), τ)
∂θ
dτ.
Because firm 1 wants to maximise the payoff from consumers, the participation
constraint must bind for θ = θmonm , which implies U(θmonm ) = 0 and therefore
U(θ) =
∫ θ
θmonm
∂u(q(τ), τ)
∂θ
dτ.
Equation (8) follows.
Now we have determined the prices for a given quality range. In the first stage
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the marginal consumer θmonm and the quality q(θ) assigned to each type has to be
determined.
The maximisation problem of firm 1 can be written as
maxq(θ),θmonm
∫ 1
θmonm
[u(q(θ), θ)− vq(θ)− ∫ θθmonm ∂u(q(τ),τ)∂τ dτ ]f(θ)dθ − ∫ 1θmonm c(q(θ))dθ
s.t. dq(θ)
dθ
≥ 0.
After integration by parts we get
max
q(θ),θmonm
∫ 1
θmonm
[u(q(θ), θ)− vq(θ)− 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
∂u(q(θ), θ)
∂θ
− c(q(θ))
f(θ)
]f(θ)dθ. (30)
Pointwise differentiation with respect to q(θ) yields (9).
Differentiation with respect to θmonm yields (10).
Because of Assumptions in A1, A2, and A3 all second order conditions and condi-
tion (28) are satisfied.
q.e.d.
8.5 Proof of Lemma 2
From equation (18) we know that the first order condition for q+2 is given by
−(F (θm)− F (θm2))
2
f(θm)
uθq(q
+
2 , θm) +
∂I(q+2 )
∂q
= 0.
We have to show that the derivative of the profit function with respect to q+2 is neg-
ative at q+2 = q
−
1 . Integrating by parts and differentiating the term in the integral,
I(q+2 ), with respect to q
+
2 we get
∂I(q+2 )
∂q+2
= −[uq(q+2 , θ(q+2 ))− v]f(θ(q+2 ))− uθq(q+2 , θ(q+2 ))[F (θ(q+2 ))− F (θm2)]− c
′(q+2 )
f(θ)
= ∂
∂θ
([−uq(q+2 , θ(q+2 )) + v][F (θ(q+2 ))− F (θm2)])− c
′(q+2 )
f(θ)
.
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Thus
∂Π2(q
−
1 ,q
+
2 =q
−
1 )
∂q+2
=
−[uq(q+2 , θ(q+2 ))− v][F (θ(q+2 ))− F (θm2)]− (F (θm)−F (θm2))
2
f(θm)
uθq(q
+
2 , θm)− c
′(q+2 )
f(θ)
=
(F (θ(q+2 ))−F (θm2))2
f(θ(q+2 ))
uθq(q
+
2 , θ(q
+
2 ))− (F (θm)−F (θm2))
2
f(θm)
uθq(q
+
2 , θm),
where the first equality follows from the fact that
∫ θ(q+2 )
θm
∂
∂θ
([−uq(q+2 , θ(q+2 ))+v][F (θ(q+2 ))−F (θm2)])f(θ)dθ = [−uq(q+2 , θ(q+2 ))+v][F (θ(q+2 ))−F (θm2)]
and the second equality follows from equation (16).
We know that θ(q+2 ) < θm so it remains to check that uθq
(F (θ)−F (θm2))2
f(θ)
is increasing
in θ.
We have
∂
∂θ
[uθq
(F (θ)−F (θm2))2
f(θ)
] =
uθq[2(F (θ)− F (θm2))− (F (θ)−F (θm2))2f ′(θ)(f(θ))2 ] + uθθq( (F (θ)−F (θm2))
2
f(θ)
) > 0
because of Assumptions A2 and A3.
q.e.d.
8.6 Proof of Proposition 6
We first show that θm2 < θmonm .
θm2 is given by the first order condition
(F (θ∗m)− F (θm2))(∂u(q
?(θ?m),θ
?
m)
∂θ?m
− f(θm2)
f(θ∗m)
[uθ(q
−
1 , θ
∗
m)− uθ(q+2 , θm)] =
f(θm2)[u(q(θm2), θm2)− c(q(θm2))f(θm2) + p2(θ∗m)− u(q+2 , θ(q+2 ))− vq(θm2)].
θmonm is given by the first order condition
[u(qmon?(θmon?m ), θ
mon?
m )− vqmon?(θmon?m )]f(θmon?m )− c(qmon∗(θ∗))
= (1− F (θmon?m ))∂u(q
mon?(θmon?m ),θ
mon?
m )
∂θmon?m
.
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Inserting θmon?m in the first order condition for θm2 yields
−f(θmon?m )
f(θm)
[uθ(q
−
1 , θm)− uθ(q+2 , θm)]
< f(θmon?m )p2(θm)− u(q+2 , θ(q+2 )) + (1− F (θm))∂u(q
mon?(θmon?m ),θ
mon?
m )
∂θmon?m
.
Thus θm2 < θmonm , more consumers are served after entry than in pure monopoly.
Now let us turn to the welfare comparison. Consumers with θ(q−1 ) ≤ θ ≤ 1 and
with θmon?m ≤ θ < θ(q+2 ) get the same quality under monopoly and under duopoly.
This is obvious because equations (9) and (16) and also equations (9) and (20) co-
incide. Consumers between θduom and θ(q
−
1 ) consume a higher quality in duopoly,
namely q−1 , than in monopoly, while consumers between θ(q
+
2 ) and θduom consume
a lower one, namely (q+2 ). Therefore we have that welfare under market entry is
only higher if
∫ θ(q−1 )
θduom
[u(q−1 , θ(q
−
1 ))− vq−1 ]f(θ)dθ − c(q−1 )− F
+
∫ θduom
θ(q+2 )
[u(q+2 , θ(q
+
2 ))− vq+2 ]f(θ)dθ − c(q+2 ) +
∫ θmonm
θ∗m2
[u(q(θ), θ)− vq(θ)− c(q(θ))
f(θ)
]f(θ)dθ
>
∫ θ(q−1 )
θ(q+2 )
[u(q(θ), θ)− vq(θ)− c(q(θ))
f(θ)
]f(θ)dθ.
Rearranging terms yields equation (22).
q.e.d.
8.7 Proof of Proposition 7
All types θ(q−1 ) < θ ≤ 1 get the same quality in duopoly than monopoly but have
to pay a price of
pduo1 (θ) = u(q(θ), θ)−
∫ θ
θ(q−1 )
∂u(q(τ), τ)
∂θ
dτ + p1(θm)− u(q−1 , θ(q−1 )).
This can also be written as pduo1 (θ) = pmon1 (θ) + p1(θduom ) − u(q−1 , θ(q−1 )) < pmon1 (θ).
Thus the price in duopoly is lower than in monopoly.
Types θ ≤ θ(q+2 ) get the same quality in duopoly as in monopoly if they are
served in both cases. The price under duopoly is pduo2 (θ) = pmon1 (θ) + p2(θduom ) −
u(q+2 , θ(q
+
2 )) < p
mon
1 (θ) and thus below the price in monopoly. Since in duopoly
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more consumer types are served as well, the consumer rent for types θ ≤ θ(q+2 ) is
weakly higher in duopoly than in monopoly.
The utility for types θ(q−1 ) ≥ θ > θ(q+2 ) in monopoly is given by
∫ θ
θmonm
∂u(q(τ),τ)
∂θ
dτ .
with θ increasing utility is increasing by ∂u(q(θ),θ)
∂θ
. In duopoly for types θ > θ(q+2 )
utility is u(q+2 , θ(q
+
2 ))−p2(q+2 ), and for types θ(q−1 ) ≥ θ utility is given by u(q−1 , θ(q−1 ))−
p1(q
−
1 ). Starting at type θ(q
+
2 ), if θ increases utility increases by uθ(q
+
2 , θ) up to θduom
and by uθ(q−1 , θ) from θduom up to θ(q
−
1 ). But since we know that U(θ(q
+
2 ))
duo >
U(θ(q+2 ))
mon and U(θ(q−1 ))duo > U(θ(q
−
1 ))
mon for all types in between θ(q+2 ) and
θ(q−1 ) utility in duopoly must be higher than in monopoly as well. Thus consumer
rent increases.
q.e.d.
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